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Abstract
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have suggested that the central bank influences the solvency
conditions of firms and households in the economic system. This “solvency rule” is examined
here within a stylised model of a monetary union characterised by different rates of
accumulation and inflation across its two member countries. The rule highlights the existence
of a relationship between the interest rate set by the central monetary authority, and the
allocation of ownership of physical capital among the member countries of the monetary
union, i.e. the “rates of capital centralization”. The paper also shows the conditions under
which the existence and stability of policy mechanisms, including deflationary, currency
devaluation and government intervention policies, are able to guarantee the achievement and
maintenance of the solvency condition in a stylised monetary union.
Keywords: Taylor rule, Solvency rule, monetary union, capital centralization, deflation,
currency devaluation.
JEL classifications: E5, F34, F36, G33, G34
 Emiliano Brancaccio (Università del Sannio, Italy) and Giuseppe Fontana (University of Leeds, UK and
Università del Sannio, Italy). Correspondence address: Giuseppe Fontana, Economics, LUBS,
University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK (E-mail: gf@lubs.leeds.ac.uk. Tel.: +44 (0)113 343 4503;
Fax: +44 (0)113 343 4465). We are grateful to the two anonymous referees of this Journal for very
helpful comments and suggestions, which have helped to improve the paper considerably. All errors are
our responsibility.
VECCHIO
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have suggested that the central bank influences the solvency
conditions of firms and households in the economic system. This “solvency rule” is examined
here within a stylised model of a monetary union characterised by different rates of
accumulation and inflation across its two member countries.
The rule highlights the existence of a relationship between the interest rate set by the central
monetary authority, and the allocation of ownership of physical capital among the member
countries of the monetary union, i.e. the “rates of capital centralization”.
The paper also shows the conditions under which the existence and stability of policy
mechanisms, including deflationary, currency devaluation and government intervention
policies, are able to guarantee the achievement and maintenance of the solvency condition in
a stylised monetary union.
NUOVO
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have suggested that the central bank influences the solvency
conditions of firms and households in the economic system. This “solvency rule” is examined
here within a stylised model of a monetary union characterised by different rates of
accumulation and inflation across its two member countries.
The rule highlights the existence of a relationship between the interest rate set by the central
monetary authority and the "rates of capital centralization", which describe the changes in the
allocation of ownership of physical capital among the member countries of the monetary
union.
The paper also shows the nexus between solvency and government debt sustainability and
examines the implications of deflationary or currency devaluation policies for the solvency
condition and the speed of capital centralization.
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1“Solvency Rule” and Capital Centralization
in a Monetary Union
Abstract
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have suggested that the central bank influences the
solvency conditions of firms and households in the economic system. This “solvency
rule” is examined here within a stylised model of a monetary union characterised by
different rates of accumulation and inflation across its two member countries. The rule
highlights the existence of a relationship between the interest rate set by the central
monetary authority, and the allocation of ownership of physical capital among the
member countries of the monetary union, i.e. the “rates of capital centralization”. The
paper also shows the conditions under which the existence and stability of policy
mechanisms, including deflationary, currency devaluation and government intervention
policies, are able to guarantee the achievement and maintenance of the solvency
condition in a stylised monetary union.
Keywords: Taylor rule, Solvency rule, monetary union, capital centralization, deflation,
currency devaluation.
JEL classifications: E5, F34, F36, G33, G34
21. Introduction
According to the conventional interpretations of monetary policy inspired by the
original works of John B. Taylor on the Federal Reserve System, the central bank
determines the interest rate as a positive function of the deviation of GDP from its
“natural” level and the deviation of the inflation rate from a given inflation target. By
following this “rule” the central monetary authority aims to stabilize the economy
around its natural equilibrium (Taylor, 1993, 1999, 2000). The Taylor rule, or
sophisticated versions of it, plays a crucial role in the so-called New Consensus
Macroeconomics (NCM) and its Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
representations (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003; see also, for a critical
analysis, Arestis, 2009; Dullien, 2011; Fontana, 2009B). Various studies have explored
the implications of the Taylor rule within the sphere of a stylized monetary union
characterized by “central” countries, with low inflation and a tendency towards current
account surplus, and “peripheral” countries, with higher inflation and current account
deficit. In presence of asymmetric shocks affecting the aggregate demand for goods and
services, the monetary policy rule adopted by the central bank could be in line with the
economic trends of the central countries, and hence to be suboptimal for the peripheral
countries of the union (Artis, 2003; Moons and Van Poeck, 2008; Chortareas, 2008).
The divergence between central and peripheral countries could then be amplified, with
the latter countries likely to experience marked fluctuations in output and
unemployment. In the absence of a federal budget and a transfer mechanism from the
central countries, the exit of peripheral countries from the monetary union could prove
an inevitable conclusion. These views are nothing new in themselves. Since the seminal
contribution of Mundell (1961), the literature on optimal currency areas has highlighted
3that the conditions for the survival of a monetary union could prove somewhat
restrictive (e.g. De Grauwe, 2000). The present crisis of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) provides some support to this view. However, this conventional line of research
does present some limitations.
First, it rests on the idea that monetary policy can affect the market interest rates
such that to bring output and the unemployment rate toward their “natural” equilibrium
levels, and hence the inflation rate toward its target level (see, for a critical assessment
of this causal link, Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). Second, it assumes that the natural
equilibrium levels of unemployment, output and interest rate are determined ultimately
by the so-called neoclassical “fundamentals” of endowments, preferences and
technology, which are considered in turn to be independent from monetary policy, and
more generally from changes in the aggregate demand (see, for a critique of this concept
of equilibrium, Kurz and Salvadori, 1995; Pasinetti, 2000; see also Fontana, 2010). The
policy implication of this view is that the Taylor rule, together with the NCM and
standard DSGE models that embed it, acknowledge the short-run real effects of
monetary policy, while accepting the neutrality of monetary policy in the long run,
when expectations are fully realized.
Furthermore, there is an interesting though often neglected corollary of this
dualistic role of monetary policy in the NCM. Monetary authorities should intervene in
favour of illiquid institutions, yet abstain from any action in the case of insolvent
institutions. The difference between illiquid and insolvent institutions in effect mimics
the distinction between the short-run and long-run effects of monetary policy. The
notion of illiquidity describes a temporary situation dictated by changes in the state of
expectations, with consequent fluctuations of economic variables around their natural
4equilibrium. By contrast, the concept of insolvency refers to financial positions that are
unsustainable in an inter-temporal equilibrium framework when expectations are fully
realised. On the basis of this distinction, the conventional analysis implicitly provides
support to the position of those who, in the course of the EMU crisis, have opposed the
use of monetary policy in order to safeguard the solvency of the member countries of
the monetary union (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012, p. 6).1
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have discussed at great length criticisms against
monetary policy rules à la Taylor, and the NCM and standard DSGE models that embed
those rules. They argue that if the mechanical (inverse) relation between the interest rate
and aggregate demand is questioned, and/or the existence of the natural equilibrium is
denied, then the logical foundations and practical usefulness of monetary policy rules à
la Taylor are called into questions. Drawing upon the broadly defined Post Keynesian
literature on the monetary circuit / endogenous money theory, Brancaccio and Fontana
(2013) have then proposed the “solvency rule” as an alternative interpretation of the
actual behaviour of monetary authorities. According to it, by setting the interest rate -
ceteris paribus - monetary authorities influence the interest rate payments to be made by
borrowers. Therefore, monetary authorities affect the solvency conditions of all
borrowers operating in the economic system. In this sense, monetary authorities perform
the role of ‘regulators’ of a social conflict between firms capable of accumulating
profits higher than interest rate payments due on their debts, and hence solvent, and
firms that tend to make losses, hence become insolvent.
Building on Brancaccio and Fontana (2013), this paper examines the working of
the solvency rule for the firms of a stylised monetary union characterised by structural
divergences due to the different rates of accumulation and inflation among its two
5member countries. In other words, the solvency condition used in this paper refers to the
financial position of the national firms (taken as all) of each country, and the consequent
allocation of ownership of existing physical capital among countries.
The paper has two main objectives. First, it explores the link, if any, between the
nominal interest rate set by the central monetary authority and the net purchases or sales
of existing physical capital between domestic and foreign firms (e.g. the cross-border
mergers and acquisitions of capital). These net purchases or sales are defined as “rates
of centralization”. 2 Secondly, it investigates the existence and stability of policy
mechanisms, including deflationary, currency devaluation and government intervention
policies, which are able to guarantee the achievement and maintenance of the solvency
condition in a stylised monetary union.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model of a stylised
monetary union. Section 3 shows the working of the solvency rule proposed by
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) in the stylised monetary union. Section 4 provides a
diagrammatic representation of the solvency conditions for the firms of the member
countries of the union. It illustrates how the interest rate policy decisions of the
monetary authority affect the allocation of ownerships of physical capital among the
countries of the union. Section 5 analyses some potential dynamics of the monetary
union under two assumptions exploring the link between the rates of capital
accumulation, the rates of capital centralization, and the mark-ups set by banks over the
nominal interest rate of the monetary authority. Section 6 discusses the effects of
deflationary and currency devaluation policies. Section 7 analyses the link between the
solvency of firms and the sustainability of the government debt. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
62. A simple model of a monetary union
This Section presents the model of a stylised monetary union. The model has some
crucial Post Keynesian and Classical features. First, the level of income and
employment are determined by the level of effective demand for goods and services,
with an exogenous rate of accumulation and different propensities to consume out of
wages and profits (Dutt, 1990). Second, the real wage is determined by a Classical
equation with an exogenous normal rate of profit (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995) and a
given monetary wage (Brancaccio, 2008). Changes in the degree of utilisation of
productive capacity from its normal level make the hypothesis of an exogenous rate of
accumulation consistent with the hypothesis of an exogenous normal rate of profit
(Garegnani, 1992; Kurz, 1994). Finally, a simplified version of the monetary circuit of
bank loans and repayment is made explicit (Graziani, 2003). Commercial banks creates
loans, that is banks set the interest rate on loans as a mark-up on the interest rate set by
the central monetary authority, and then accommodate the demand for loans by
creditworthy firms (Lavoie, 2003; Fontana, 2009A, Ch. 8).3 The only limit to the supply
of loans is thus given by the willingness of firms to borrow, and by the willingness of
banks to grant creditworthy status to firms.4
The stylised monetary union consists of country I and country II, and a central
monetary authority issuing a common currency. Each country has its own workers,
firms and their owners considered as a whole a consolidated sector (see, for a similar
approach, Kaldor, 1966; Gupta & Lensik 1996), and commercial banks. The existence
of a national (or supranational) government is in the first instance ignored. This
simplifying hypothesis which allows the analysis to focus on the relationship between
monetary policy and the solvency condition of the monetary union is removed in
7Section 7. Commercial banks only make loans to national firms in order to finance the
acquisition of national capital goods, and to re-finance previous loans. Firms of each
country can accumulate or de-cumulate financial assets, namely bonds, against the firms
of the other country. Wages are paid ex post, hence firms do not require loans for this
purpose. This means that the relevant interest rate payment for the analysis in this paper
is the interest rate payment for the loans made by commercial banks to firms. Interest
rate payments to workers for their deposits, to the central monetary authority for the
supply of monetary reserves, and to capitalists for their bank equity assets do not alter
the main features of the loan supply process, and are ignored here for the sake of the
simplicity of the analysis. Similarly, bank loans to households and financial
intermediaries and related interest rate payments are ignored for the simplicity of the
analysis.
Each country produces one good which acts as both a consumer good and an
investment good. The investment good is produced in one period, and then fully used in
the next period. For the sake of simplicity, it is also assumed that Tobin’s-q is equal to
unity (Tobin 1969), namely that the going market price for exchanging existing capital
assets (the market price of old capital) is equal to the replacement or reproduction cost
of capital (the market price for the newly produced capital). As a result, the absence of
fixed capital (of infinite duration) does not alter the analysis of the stylised monetary
union with circulating capital only. Furthermore, under the same assumption that
Tobin’s-q is equal to unity, the existence of the equity market where capital is bought
and sold can be ignored.
Each country has also an abundant supply of labour services and of productive
capacity, i.e. the level of effective demand determines the degree of utilization of labour
8and capital. For the sake of simplicity of the analysis, it is also assumed that workers
spend all their wages on national goods, whereas firms use their profits either to buy
foreign goods, conceived as consumption goods for their owners, or to repay bank
loans. If firms cannot meet their debts requirements towards banks, they have either to
renegotiate new bank loans or sell part or all of their capital.
The key macroeconomic variables for country I are the following. Y is the level
of production corresponding to the normal utilisation of the productive capacity, L is the
number of workers employed in the production process, K is the physical quantity of the
capital used, W is the nominal wage, r is the normal rate of profit, and P the nominal
price correspondent to the normal rate of profit and the current nominal wage. The
productive technology used is y = Y/L, k = K/L, and hence K/Y = k/y. It is then assumed
that the income produced is distributed entirely between firms and workers: ܻܲ =ܹܮ + (1 + ݎ)ܲܭ. Therefore, it follows:
(1)ܲ = ൬ 1ͳ െ (1 + ݎ)(݇/ݕ)൰ ܹݕ
A similar equation can be derived for country II. Using the prime symbol to
indicate its key macroeconomic variables, namely Yc, Lc, Kc, Wc, rc, Pc, yc, and kc, it
follows:ሺͳԢሻܲԢ ൌ ሺ 1ͳ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎԢሻ(݇ԢȀݕԢ)) ܹԢݕԢ
Equations (1) and (1c) describe the price of the consumption and investment
good for country I and country II, when the degree of utilisation of productive capacity
is at its normal level Y and Yc, respectively. However, for a given productive technique
and a normal rate of profit, changes in aggregate demand trigger a deviation in the
degree of utilisation of productive capacity away from its normal level.
9In order to highlight the effects of a change in the aggregate demand for country
I, the following variables are introduced: Y* is the current level of production, u = Y*/Y
is the actual degree of utilisation of productive capacity, and (ȖU) is the actual rate of
profit, which deviates from the normal rate r as a result of changes in either the price
level P or in the degree of utilisation of the productive capacity u. Assuming for the
sake of simplicity that there are not changes in the degree of utilisation of labour, it
follows that ܲݑܻ =ܹݑܮ + (1 + ߛݎ) ௧ܲିଵܭ. Then, with ʌ 3t/Pt-1) -1) indicating the
rate of inflation, it follows that the actual degree of utilisation of productive capacity for
country I is:
(2)ݑ = (1 + ߛݎ)݇
(1 + ߨ)(ݕ െܹ/ܲ)
Similarly, the actual degree of utilisation of productive capacity for country II is:ሺʹԢሻݑԢ ൌ (1 + ߛԢݎԢሻ݇Ԣ
(1 + ߨᇱ)(ݕᇱ െܹԢȀܲԢ )
The final equation of the stylised monetary union model presented in this paper
describes the macroeconomic equilibrium between production and aggregate demand.
Therefore, an equation for investment, imports and exports needs to be added to the
model. The investment expenditure of the firms of country I and country II are defined
as I = (1+g)PK and Ic = (1+gc)PcKc, respectively, where g and gc are the rate of capital
accumulation for the two countries. The expenditure for imports of countries I and II is
given respectively by:ܯ = ݉଴(1 + ߛݎ) ௧ܲିଵܭ +݉ଵ(ܲ െ ܲᇱ)ܭ
andܯԢ ൌ ݉ᇱ଴(1 + ߛᇱݎᇱ)ܲᇱ௧ିଵܭԢ ൅݉ᇱଵ(ܲ െ ܲᇱ)ܭԢ
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where m0 and mc0 represent the share of profits used by firms to buy foreign goods, and
m1 and mc1 measure the imports elasticity to price differentials of the countries, with
m1>0 and mc1<0. Since there are only two countries in the model, the expenditure for
exports of country I is equal to the expenditure for imports of country II, and vice versa.
In other words, it is: X=Mc and Xc=M. It follows then that the macroeconomic
equilibrium of countries I and II is respectively:ܹݑܮ + (1 + ߛݎ) ௧ܲିଵܭ =ܹݑܮ + (1 + ݃)ܲܭ +ܯᇱ െܯܹԢݑԢܮԢ ൅ (1 + ߛᇱݎᇱ)ܲᇱ௧ିଵܭԢ ൌ ܹԢݑԢܮԢ ൅ (1 + ݃ᇱ)ܲԢܭԢ ൅ܯ െܯԢ
The combination of the conditions of macroeconomic equilibrium for countries I
and II gives rise to a system of two equations with two unknowns Ȗ and Ȗc, which
contribute to the determination of the actual rates of profit ȖU and Ȗcrc. If for simplicity
m0=mc0, the macroeconomic equilibrium for countries I and II is respectively:
(3) 1 + ߛݎ = (1+݉0)(1+ߨ)(1+݃)+(݉0)ቀ1+ߨԢቁቀ1+݃Ԣቁ+ቀ݉1Ԣ െ݉1ቁ(ߨെߨԢ)
1+2݉0
(3c) 1 + ߛᇱݎᇱ = (ଵା௠బ)൫ଵାగᇲ൯൫ଵା௚ᇲ൯ା(௠బ)(ଵାగ)(ଵା௚)ା൫௠భି௠భᇲ ൯(గିగᇲ)ଵାଶ௠బ
Assuming that the conditions of existence and uniqueness of an economically
significant equilibrium are satisfied, the systems of equations (1) - (2) - (3) and (1c) -
(2c) - (3c) can be solved in the following way. Given the price levels in the previous
period Pt-1 and Pct-1, the technique k, the output-labour ratio y, the monetary wage W, the
normal rate of profit r, the rate of accumulation g and the parameters m0 and m1, and
with Pc and ʌc known from equation (1c), then equation (1) determines P (and then ʌ),
equation (3) determines Ȗ, and equation (2) determines u. In a similar way, it is possible
to determine Pc (and ʌc ), Ȗc, and uc for country II in the system of equations (1c) - (2c) -
(3c).5 Finally, the trade balance between the two countries is determined as follows:
11
t = M c/ Pct-1Kc - M / Pt-1K, which it corresponds to:
ݐ = ݉଴
1 + 2݉଴ ൣ൫1 + ߨ ƍ൯൫1 + ݃ƍ൯െ (1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃)൧+ 11 + 2݉଴ ൣ൫݉ଵƍ െ݉ଵ൯൫ߨ െ ߨ ƍ൯൧
3. Solvency rule and rates of capital centralization
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have suggested a “solvency rule” as an alternative to the
Taylor rule in order to explain how through changes in the nominal interest rate the
central bank influences the solvency conditions of firms and workers in a closed
economy.6 According to the solvency rule, on average firms are solvent if their income
is equal or greater than their expenditure in correspondence with the macroeconomic
equilibrium. In the case of a stylized monetary union this condition can be expressed in
the following terms: in correspondence with the macroeconomic equilibrium, the firms
of country I are solvent if the sum of their profits and new bank loans is equal to, or
greater than, the total expenditure on foreign goods, bank debt repayments and net
acquisition of capital from the firms of country II. A similar proposition applies for the
solvency of the firms of country II.
In order to derive a solvency rule equation for the firms of countries I and II, the
following variables are introduced: i is the nominal interest rate set by the central
monetary authority, s the mark-up on i set by the banks of country I in order to
determine the interest rate on bank loans in the same country, sc the mark-up on i set by
the banks of country II in order to determine the interest rate on bank loans in country
II, cFL the new set of bank loans to the firms of country I, ccFLc the new set of bank
loans to the firms of country II, and ǻ.A the net acquisition by the firms of country I of
existing capital from the firms of country II. Please note that FL (and FLc) denotes the
planned or desired debt-financed spending of firms, and c (and cc) is the proportion of
12
bank loans to firms that are deemed creditworthy by banks. Therefore, the supply of
bank loans cFL (and ccFLc) is therefore the effective supply of loans, which may differ
from the desired amount of bank loans FL (and FLc) demanded by firms. The mark-ups
s and sc measure the liquidity preference of the commercial banks of countries I and II
(Fontana, 2009A, Ch. 7), respectively, and are determined by several factors, including
the market powers of banks and the country-risks faced by their borrowers. Lastly, the
net national amount of financial assets issued by the firms of country I is represented by
the term NFAt, which can be positive, negative or zero depending on whether the firms
are net creditor, net debtor or in balance with the firms of country II. Similarly, the term
NFA´t indicates the net national amount of financial assets issued by the firms of
country II vis-à-vis the firms of country I. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
for the firms of each country the interest rate on financial assets is equal to the interest
rate on bank loans, i.e. the cost of borrowing from banks or foreign firms is equal. It
follows then that the solvency rule equation for the firms of countries I is:ܹݑܮ + (1 + ߛݎ) ௧ܲିଵܭ + ܿܨܮ + (1 + ݏ݅)ܰܨܣ௧ିଵ൒ ܹݑܮ + (1 + ݃)ܲܭ +݉଴(1 + ߛݎ) ௧ܲିଵܭ +݉ଵ(ܲ െ ܲᇱ)ܭ
+ (1 + ݏ݅)ܿܨܮ௧ିଵ +ܰܨܣ௧ + ܲכοܭ஺
where:ܿܨܮ = (1 + ݃)ܲܭ + ߣ(1 + ݏ݅)ܿܨܮ௧ିଵܿܨܮ௧ିଵ = (1 + ݃) ௧ܲିଵܭ௧ିଵ + ߣ௧ିଵ(1 + ݏ݅)ܿܨܮ௧ିଶ
Also, it is:ܲכ = ܲ݂݅οܭ < 0ܲכ = ܲᇱ݂݅οܭ > 0
If ǻ.A is positive (negative), it means that the firms of country I are buying (selling)
13
existing capital at price Pc (P) from (to) the firms of country II. Therefore, if ǻ.A is
positive the current price P* of the existing capital traded among the two countries is Pc,
while if ǻ.A is negative it is P.
7KH WHUPȜ DQGȜc) is a measure of the degree of “financial instability” in the
economic system (Minsky, 1977). It represents an indicator of the degree to which firms
UHILQDQFH WKHLUGHEWVZLWKEDQNV$Q LQFUHDVH LQȜ DQGRUȜc) means that firms do not
repay in full their debts, but instead apply to banks for fresh loans in order to cover their
debts obligations towards the banks. In this case, the distinction first made famous by
Minsky (op. cit.) among hedge, speculative and Ponzi financial profiles applies. The
prospective income flows of firms with a hedge profile cover interest rate payments and
the principle. The near-term income flows of firms with a speculative profile only cover
interest rate payments. Finally, the near-term receipts of firms with a Ponzi profile are
even insufficient to cover interest rate payments. As Minsky warned, during a business
cycle expansion, firms may increasingly move from a hedge position to a speculative or
even a Ponzi position. This will then have serious implications for the financial health
of both firms and banks. For instance, the banks most exposed towards firms with
speculative and Ponzi profiles may then be forced to make up for the missing
reimbursements by contracting debts with the banks of the other country, or with the
central monetary authority.7
At this stage it is also worth highlighting that bank only accommodate the
demand for loans of firms deemed to be creditworthy, and at a price, the interest on
loans, as well as other lending conditions, of their own choice. The latter, as well as the
definition of creditworthiness, change over time for various reasons, including the
liquidity preference of banks (Dow, 1997; Rotheim, 2006). For instance, if Ȝ (or Ȝc)
14
increases, and banks become aware of increasing lending and borrowing risks, that is if
the preference of banks for liquid assets increases, banks may raise the mark-up s (or sc)
and/or refuse credit altogether by reducing c (and/or cc), that is some firms may lose
their creditworthiness status. In other words, the desires of firms to raise leverage and to
move to more speculative or Ponzi positions could be frustrated by the lending criteria
set by banks.
By substituting cFL and cFLt-1 in the solvency condition, defining the rate of
change of net financial assets with the term į   1)$t+1/NFAt-1), rearranging and
dividing the whole by Pt-1K, it follows:
1 + ߛݎ ൒ 1ͳ െ݉଴ ቈ(ͳ െ ߣ)(1 + ݏ݅) +݉ଵ(ߨ െ ߨᇱ) + (1 + ߨכ)οܭ஺ܭ + (ߜ െ ݏ݅) ܰܨܣ௧௧ܲିଵܭ቉
where ʌ refers to the domestic or foreign inflation rates depending on whether ǻ.A is
positive (i.e. net foreign purchases) or negative (i.e. net foreign sales). By substituting
equation (3) in the condition of solvency, assuming gc ǻ.A/K, and nfa = NFAt /Pt-1K,
it then follows:
(4) ݃௖ ൑ (ͳ െ݉଴)ଶ(1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃) + (݉଴ െ݉଴ଶ)(1 + ߨᇱ)(1 + ݃ᇱ)(1 + ߨכ)(1 + 2݉଴)
+ ቈ(ͳ െ݉଴)(݉ଵᇱ െ݉ଵ)
(1 + 2݉଴) െ݉ଵ቉ (ߨ െ ߨᇱ)(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣ) + ߜ݂݊ܽ(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣ)െ ݂݊ܽ
(1 + ߨכ) ݏ݅
Condition (4) describes the solvency condition for the firms of country I. In a similar
way, it is possible to derive a condition (4c) for the solvency of firms of country II, with
Ȝ measuring the degree of financial instability of the firms of country II and
į 1)$t+1/NFA´t-1). Since for accounting reasons įQID įQID, it follows that:
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(ͶԢ) ݃Ԣ௖ ൑ (ͳ െ݉଴)ଶ(1 + ߨᇱ)(1 + ݃ᇱ) + (݉଴ െ݉଴ଶ)(1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃)(1 + ߨכ)(1 + 2݉଴)
+ ቈ(ͳ െ݉଴)(݉ᇱଵ െ݉ଵ)
(1 + 2݉଴) െ݉ଵ቉ (ߨ െ ߨᇱ)(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣᇱ) െ ߜ݂݊ܽ(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣᇱ) + ݂݊ܽ
(1 + ߨכ) ݏᇱ݅
The terms gc and g´c can be defined as the “rates of centralization” of physical
capital. They refer to net purchases of foreign capital, i.e. the buying and selling and
consequent ownership transfers from one country to the other of already existing
capital, divided by the total amount of existing capital in the country examined. These
rates correspond to net sales or acquisitions of existing capital that are necessary to
guarantee the respect of the solvency conditions for the firms of country I and II,
respectively. For example, a positive rate of centralization gc indicates that in aggregate
terms the firms of country I acquire existing physical capital from the firms of country
II. By contrast, a negative rate of centralization gc indicates that in aggregate terms the
firms of country I need to sell physical capital to the firms of country II in order to be
solvent. A similar argument applies to country II for a positive or negative rate of
centralization g´c, respectively. There is therefore a difference between the terms gc and
g´c, and g and g´, which represent the actual rates of accumulation of newly formed
capital.
Conditions (4) and (4c) can be interpreted as an application of the solvency rule
proposed by Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) to the case of a stylised monetary union.
Once the solutions of the systems (1) - (2) - (3) and (1c) - (2c) - (3c) have been
determined, and on the preliminary assumption that the spreads s and sc and the degrees
of financial instability Ȝ and Ȝc are given, solvency conditions (4) and (4’) describe the
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relationship between the nominal interest rate i set by the monetary authority and the
rates of centralization gc and g´c. Compared to its original version, the solvency rule
examined here presents a novelty. In fact, it connects not only the interest rate to the
inflation rate and the rate of accumulation, but also to net sales of capital from one
country to the other. As it is argued in the next Sections, by influencing the solvency
conditions of the firms of countries I and II, the interest rate decisions of the central
monetary authority may become crucial for the allocation of ownerships of physical
capital between the two countries.
4. Monetary policy, solvency and capital centralization
The solvency rule represented by conditions (4) and (4c) highlights the existence of a
relationship between the interest rate i set by the central monetary authority and the
rates of capital centralization gc and g´c. This relationship is examined below in greater
depth with the aid of a diagram (Figure 1). The X-axis displays the rate of interest i set
by the central bank, while the Y-axis presents the rates of centralization gc and gcc. The
lines (4) and (4c) represent the respective solvency conditions under the constraint of
strict equality. They show that as the interest rate increases, the related rates of
centralization consistent with solvency tend to decrease. When the lines cross the X-
axis, the rates of centralization become negative. From that point onwards the firms of
countries I and II are obliged to sell capital in order to remain solvent, hence they move
from the position of net buyer of physical capital assets to the position of net seller of
physical capital. In turn, this will affect the inflation rate used to measure the capital
assets. For instance, in the case of country I, if gc > 0, then country I is a net buyer,
hence the inflation rate refers to foreign capital: ʌ ʌc. Alternatively, if gc < 0, then
country I is a net seller, hence ʌ  ʌ. A similar argument applies to country II. For
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each country, the solvency of firms is guaranteed only by the area situated beneath its
own line.
In order to simplify the graphical representation, it is initially assumed that nfa =
0. For a non-negative rate of interest, an intersection of the lines representing the
equations (4) and (4´) exists for economically significant values, if the following
condition is observed:ݏሺͳ െ ߣ)(1 + ߨכሻ ് ݏᇱሺͳ െ ߣᇱ)(1 + ߨכ). If this condition is not
met, the two lines are parallel. If the condition is satisfied, equations (4) and (4c) will be
represented by two broken lines that change in inclination at the point of intersection
with the X-axis. The lines will have one or two intersections economically significant.
In every case, the broken lines will form a quadrilateral. In the particular case in which
ʌ!ʌc, s = sc, andȜ Ȝc the quadrilateral takes the form of a parallelogram. This case is
represented in Figure 1 below.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1
The decision of the monetary authority on the interest rate will place the
monetary union in one of the five areas indicated by the numbers (I), (II), (III), (IV), and
(V). For example, if the central monetary authority sets the interest rate along the
segment ܱܣതതതത of the X-axis, the financial position of the member of the union will be
represented by area (I). In this area the conditions of solvency (4) and (4c) can be
satisfied with non-negative rates of centralization: ݃௖ ൒ Ͳ and ݃௖ᇱ ൒ Ͳ. This means that
the firms of both countries are capable of meeting their respective conditions of
solvency without having to sell capital to the firms of the other country. Of course, this
does not imply that cross-border takeovers and sales of capital would not occur. It just
means that these takeovers and sales would not be necessary for solvency purposes.
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In area (II) the rate of centralization of country II is positive, while the rate of
centralization of country I is negative, i.e. ݃௖ ൑ Ͳ and ݃Ԣ௖ ൒ Ͳ. The firms of country I
need to transfer ownership of physical capital to the firms of country II in order to be
solvent. Furthermore, the firms of country II are capable of purchasing all of the
physical capital assets offered by the firms of country I. This capital haemorrhage from
country I to country II continues in area (III). The rate of centralization of country I is
more and more negative. The firms of country I need to make large transfer of physical
capital in order to be solvent. However, in this case the firms of country II are not able
to buy all the physical capital offered by the other country. Thus, if the central monetary
authority sets the interest rate along the segment ܤܥതതതത of the X-axis, a third party buyer is
necessary to avoid the risk of insolvency for some firms of country I. Area (IV) and area
(V) represent the situation of a general solvency crisis. The firms of country I and II
need to make large sales of physical capital in order to be solvent.
So far it has been assumed that nfa = 0. This simplifying assumption is now
relaxed, such that the firms of country I can accumulate or de-cumulate financial assets,
against the firms of country II, and vice versa. This has important consequences. In the
case of country I, the sign of the relationship between the rate of centralization gc and
the interest rate i now depends on the sign of the following expression: >ȜQID@ (an
analogous relationship also holds for the firms of country II). It then follows that an
increase in the interest rate does not necessarily lead like before to a decrease in the rate
of centralization. For instance, if the firms of country I have accumulated financial
assets against the firms of country II, and they are able to obtain new bank loans, the
expression above maybe greater than zero. Therefore, the rate of centralization gc is now
correlated positively with the interest rate i. In terms of Figure 1, this means that above
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the X-axis the slope of the solvency line (4) becomes positive. The firms of the country
I now gain from an increase in the interest rate, while this is not the case for the firms of
country II. This is of course only one of many potential outcomes when the firms of
country I accumulate financial assets against the firms of country II. But this outcome
provides further evidence of the significance of the relationship between the interest rate
set by the central monetary authority and the allocation of ownership of physical capital
among the member countries of a monetary union. In the circumstances described
above, other things being equal, the central monetary authority may exacerbate the
transfer of ownership of physical capital from country I to country II.
Finally, Figure 1 is constructed under simplifying assumptions and for given
values of the variables and parameters contained in the equations (4) and (4c).
Therefore, the nominal interest rate set by the central monetary authority is only one of
the variables determining the area where the monetary union will fall. Yet, the diagram
shows that the role of the central monetary authority is far more crucial than it is
generally thought to be in the conventional NCM literature. The allocation of existing
capital among member countries of the union depends significantly on the policy
decisions of the central monetary authority. Far from being neutral, these policy
decisions have therefore important long-run effects on the economic structure of the
member states of the monetary union.8
5. Capital accumulation, interest rate mark-ups and solvency
Conditions (4) and (4c) show that in the absence of deliberate actions of the central
monetary authority, the solvency of the stylised monetary union is only maintained
through a continuous transfer of capital ownership from the debtor country toward the
creditor country or an external creditor.9 These conclusions rest on a model which has
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been so far based mainly on accounting relationships (see, for some motivations of this
methodological “objectivism”, Kurz and Salvadori, 2005). These relationships are in
this Section supplemented with two behavioural hypotheses in order to make some
conjectures about the potential dynamics of the monetary union.
Starting with the first behavioural hypothesis, it is now assumed that the rates of
accumulation of capital depend on the rates of centralization of the previous period. In
particular, it is assumed that the rate of accumulation is lowered when the rate of
centralization of the previous period has been positive, since in this case firms prefer to
purchase already existing capital rather than risking to produce new capital.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the rate of accumulation falls when the rate of
centralization of the previous period has been negative, since firms will be reluctant to
make investment in new capital, when they are forced to sell existing capital in order to
be solvent (empirical support for these propositions is offered among others by Wang
2010). It then follows that for country I the relationship between capital accumulation
and capital centralization can be described in the following terms:
(5)݃ = ݃଴ െ ݒ(݃௖(௧ିଵ))ଶ
where g0 and v are exogenous parameters. A similar relationship can be derived for
country II in terms of ݃ᇱ and ݃௖(௧ିଵ)ᇱ .
The second behavioural hypothesis is that the mark-ups set by banks over the
nominal interest rate i fixed by the monetary authority depend on the rates of
centralization of the previous period. This is due to the fact that the component of the
mark-up which makes s and sc different represents the spread which measures the risk of
lending to the firms of a specific country. More precisely, it is assumed that the greater
is the amount of capital that the firms of a country have to sell in order to be solvent,
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ceteris paribus the higher is the country-risk faced by these firms, then the riskier these
firms will be considered, and hence the higher is the mark-up required by banks (a
similar case could also be made when firms borrow directly from the market). In
general, the riskier firms are perceived, the higher will be the mark-up s or sc that they
will have to face when borrowing from banks or the market.10 It then follows that for
country I the relationship between capital centralization and the mark-up can be
expressed by the following equation:
(6)ݏ = ݏ଴ െ ݍ(݃௖(௧ିଵ))
where s0 and q are exogenous parameters. A similar relationship can be derived for
country II in terms of ݃ᇱ and ݃௖(௧ିଵ)ᇱ .
By substituting equations (5) and (6) in (4), imposing the constraint of strict
equality and rearranging the whole, it follows:
(7) ݃௖(௧) = ܽ൫݃௖(௧ିଵ)൯ଶ + ܾ(݃௖(௧ିଵ)) + ܿ
where:ܽ = െݒ(ͳ െ݉଴ଶ)(1 + ߨ)
(1 + ߨכ)(1 + 2݉଴)
ܾ = ݍ[(ͳ െ ߣ)െ ݂݊ܽ]݅
(1 + ߨכ)ܿ = (ͳ െ݉଴ଶ)(1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃଴) + (݉଴ െ݉଴ଶ)(1 + ߨᇱ)(1 + ݃ᇱ)
(1 + ߨכ)(1 + 2݉଴)
+ ቈ(ͳ െ݉଴)(݉ଵᇱ െ݉ଵ)
1 + 2݉଴ െ݉ଵ቉ (ߨ െ ߨᇱ)(1 + ߨכ)െ [(ͳ െ ߣ)െ ݂݊ܽ]ݏ଴݅(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣ) + ߜ݂݊ܽ
(1 + ߨכ)
Again, like for equations (5) and (6), there will be a corresponding equation (7’) for
country II.
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Compared to the conditions (4) and (4’), equations (7) and (7’) describe a
solvency rule that assigns an even more crucial and problematic role to the central bank.
For instance, if a steady state condition gc(t) = gc(t-1) is imposed, the relationship between
the interest rate and the rate of centralization necessary for the solvency of the firms of
country I is not straightforward. Condition (4) described in Figure 1 is always
characterized by a negative derivative dgc/di, with the exception of the case of nfa > 0
and a high Ȝ, that is when the firms of country I have accumulated financial assets
against the firms of country II, and they are able to obtain new bank loans. By contrast,
the condition (7) has several points in which dgc/di > 0. The case of nfa > 0 and a high Ȝ
makes the possibility of a positive derivative dgc/di even more frequent and binding.
This positive correlation between the rate of centralization and the interest rate can also
happen below the X-axis, where negative rates of centralization can result in a reduction
of the rates of accumulation and an increase in spreads so pronounced such as to require
a further reduction of the interest rate i in order to ensure that the firms of country I are
solvent. A similar argument of course applies to the firms of country II with condition
(7’).
In such a case, the net sales of capital cannot contribute to improving the
financial position of the firms of a country and may even damage it. As a result, the
room for manoeuvre of the monetary authority is more limited: in order to guarantee the
achievement and maintenance of the solvency condition, the central monetary authority
can only set a very narrow range of positive interest rates i that are compatible with non-
negative rates of centralizations for countries I and II. Furthermore, any relationship
based on conditions (7) and (7c) is likely to be unstable (see, for an analysis of these
types of dynamic equations, Sydsæter et al. 2008). In this context, both the
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circumstances for the achievement of the solvency conditions and those for their
maintenance become more restrictive. As a consequence, the role of monetary policy
becomes necessary not only to determine the solvency of the member countries of the
monetary union but also to preserve it.
6. Deflation, currency devaluation and solvency
The (1) – (6) and (1c) – (6c) models described so far in this paper are an useful starting
point for wide-ranging analyses of the link between monetary policy and capital
centralization in a monetary union. They are also helpful to reinterpret the notion of
“Mezzogiornification of Europe”, which was originally put forward by Krugman
(1991).11 However, the (1) – (6) and (1c) – (6c) models do not consider the implications
of price flexibility on the solvency conditions of the firms of countries I and II. Yet the
changes in the inflation rate and their effects on relative competitiveness and net exports
have often been considered suitable to deal with solvency issues among member
countries of a monetary union. For instance, Blanchard (2007, 2012) has suggested that
deflationary policies in peripheral countries of the EMU (e.g. Greece) will help these
countries to prosper again, since firms in these countries are less competitive and
operate with higher costs. The European Central Bank (ECB) itself has given its support
to the peripheral countries of the EMU provided that they adopt deflation policies
(Draghi, 2012). Others suggest that the rebalancing of the EMU cannot be achieved
only through the efforts of the less competitive countries, and therefore have suggested
inflationary policy like an increase in nominal wages in the central countries of the
EMU (e.g. Germany) (see, for example, Brancaccio 2012).12 Although these studies
suggest opposite solutions, they have in common the fact that the flexibility of prices is
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considered effective for the purpose of rebalancing competitiveness and achieving
solvency among member countries of a monetary union.
In the models described in this paper, changes in the inflation rates produce three
main effects in countries I and II. First, they affect the rate of profit consistent with the
macroeconomic equilibrium of each country. Second, they alter the relative
competitiveness, and hence the trade balance of the two countries: since by definition
mc1 < 0, the overall value of ݀ݐ ݀πΤ ൌ െ݉଴(1 + ݃ƍ)/(1 + 2݉଴) + (݉ଵƍ െ݉ଵ)/(1 +
2݉଴) is always negative. Finally, changes in the inflation rates affect the value of the
existing capital assets. In particular, deflation reduces the value of capital, and thus can
force firms to sell a greater amount of physical capital in order to remain solvent. It
follows that the overall outcome of changes in the inflation rates depends on the relative
strength of these three effects, which cannot be determined a priori. Conditions (4) and
(4c) confirm that ݀݃௖ ݀πΤ and ݀݃௖ᇱ ݀ߨᇱΤ are of uncertain signs. More specifically, these
derivatives become negative only for high absolute values of the parameters m1 and mc1,
which indicates the sensitivity of the trade balances to changes in the price levels. For
H[DPSOHDVVXPLQJWKDWFRXQWU\,LVDQHWEX\HUDQGWKDWʌ ʌc, it then follows:݀݃௖ ݀πΤ < 0 for ݉ଵƍ < [(1 + 2݉଴ሻȀሺͳ െ݉଴) + 1]݉ଵ െ (ͳ െ݉଴)(1 + ݃).
In this case, changes in the inflation rate determine effects of the same sign in
the solvency condition and in the trade balance of the country under consideration. In
summary, the solvency condition and the trade balance impose different constraints to
the firms of each country of the monetary union. For a low sensitivity of net exports to
price changes, deflation policies could worsen rather than improve the solvency
condition of a country. Furthermore, it is easy to see that also the signs of
(ߜ݃௖ ߜπΤ )݀π+ (ߜ݃௖ ߜ݅Τ )݀݅ and (ߜ݃௖ᇱ ߜπΤ )݀π+ (ߜ݃௖ᇱ ߜ݅Τ )݀݅ are uncertain. Such result
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raises doubts about the widespread idea that the central bank of a monetary union can
help a country to achieve solvency by demanding deflation policies in exchange for
lower interest rates. Finally, the effects of price changes are even more controversial in
the model represented by the conditions (7) and (7'): a deflationary process, in
particular, could increase the instability of the solvency rule.
Some economists and policy-makers also held the view that the abandonment of
the monetary union and consequent currency devaluation could be a more effective way
to obtain solvency. In order to analyses the effects of currency devaluation policies, the
(1) – (2) – (3) and (1c) – (2c) – (3c) models need to be slightly amended by multiplying
the term İ*) for ʌ*) in the solvency conditions (4) and (4c), respectively, where
E is the exchange rate and İ its rate variation over time, i.e. 1 + ߝ = ܧ௧/ܧ௧ିଵ. For all
values of ݃௖ < 0, then ߝכ = 0 and ߨכ = ߨ; and for values of ݃௖ > 0, then ߝכ = ߝ andߨכ = ߨ. In all these cases, the sign of ߜ݃௖ ߜߝΤ is uncertain. In other words, the overall
effects of currency devaluation policies on the solvency conditions of the firms of
country I are indeterminate. In the specific case in which ݃௖ < 0, a devaluation policy
not only increases competitiveness, but also reduces the value of existing capital, which
means that even larger quantities of capital may have to be sold in order to guarantee the
solvency condition. A similar argument can also be made by examining the (1) – (6)
model and the solvency condition (7). For example, there is no guarantee that a
devaluation policy would contribute to make stable a hypothetical solution for gc.
These policies could actually hinder any possible attempt by the central monetary
authority to make the solvency conditions independent from sales of capital abroad in
order to avoid situations in which dgc/di>0. The same results, again, apply for country
II.
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It may be interesting to note that the models described above suggest a further
interpretation of the so-called fire sales of capital that typically occur when a country
abandons a monetary union and devalues its own currency. According to Froot and
Stein (1989) and Krugman (1998), the depreciation of the domestic currency lowers the
relative wealth of domestic firms, which in turn lead to foreign acquisitions of certain
domestic capital assets. The models described above suggest an additional explanation
for the fire sales of capital. A currency devaluation policy may lead to a depreciation of
domestic capital assets so pronounced that firms need to sell more capital assets than
initially planned in order to be solvent. Furthermore, under certain conditions, a
currency devaluation policy can push the economic system in an area where dgc/di>0,
which means that the sales of capital abroad trigger a downward spiral that threatens the
solvency condition.13
7. Solvency of firms and the sustainability of government debt
The stylised monetary union presented in the previous sections ignored the existence of
a national (or supranational) government. This simplifying hypothesis allowed the
analysis to focus on the relationship between monetary policy and the solvency
condition of firms. The hypothesis is removed in this section in order to analyse the link
between the solvency of firms and the sustainability of the government debt. The
additional macroeconomic variables for country I to be considered are the following. Z
is the nominal government expenditure and z = Z/Pt-1K is the government expenditure
in relation to the capital. If for the sake of simplicity it is assumed that only profits are
taxed at a rate ȥ, then the nominal tax revenues correspond to ; ȥȖU3t-1K, while
[ ȥȖU is the tax revenues in relation to the capital, and m0 P ȥ is the
propensity to import net of taxation. For simplicity, it is again assumed that nfa = 0. It
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then follows that the national income and the macroeconomic equilibrium between the
production and demand of country I are 3X< :X/ȥȖU3t-1K and PuY = C
+ I + Z + X – M, respectively. A similar set of variables and equations can be derived
from country II by using the prime symbol.
The solvency condition for the firms of country I is then:݃௖൑ ሾͳ െ݉ଶ(ͳ െ ߰)ଶ][(1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃) + ݖ] + [݉(ͳ െ ߰) െ݉ଶ(ͳ െ ߰)ଶ[(1 + ߨᇱ)(1 + ݃ᇱ) + ݖԢሿ
(1 + ߨכ)(1 + ߰)(1 + 2݉଴)
+ ቈ[ͳ െ݉(ͳ െ ߰)](݉ଵᇱ െ݉ଵ)
(1 + ߰)(1 + 2݉଴) െ݉ଵ቉ (ߨ െ ߨᇱ)(1 + ߨכ)െ (ͳ െ ߣ)(1 + ߨכ) (1 + ݏ݅)
The condition of sustainability of the government debt for country I can now be
derived. The nominal stock of government debt of the country I is represented by the
following accounting identity, namely Dt = Dt-1 + siDt-1 + Zt - Xt, while the stock of
government debt in relation to the capital is dt = Dt / Pt-1K. Following Pasinetti (1998),
it is assumed that the government debt is sustainable if dtGt-1. It then follows that the
government spending that stabilizes the public debt is zs>JʌVL@G[. But, since
[ ȥȖU, thenݖ௦൑ (1 + ߰)[(1 + 2݉(ͳ െ ߰)]
(1 + ߰) െ݉(ͳ െ ߰) + 2݉(ͳ െ ߰)ଶ െ ͳ ቊ[(݃ + ߨ) െ ݏ݅]݀
+
[1 +݉(ͳ െ ߰)](1 + ߨ)(1 + ݃) +݉(ͳ െ ߰)[(1 + ߨᇱ)(1 + ݃ᇱ) + ݖᇱ] + (݉ଵᇱ െ݉ଵ)(ߨ െ ߨᇱ)
(ͳ െ ߰)ଶ(1 + 2݉) ቋ
Again, two similar equations can be derived for country II.
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There are two main implications that can be derived for country I from the new
solvency condition of firms and the condition of sustainability of government debt.
First, the inclusion of the national government in the model increases the importance of
the decisions of the monetary authority for the overall dynamics of the system. In fact, if
the central monetary authority sets a relatively high interest rate, then the solvency of
firms deteriorates both directly, because of the increase (other things being equal) in
cost of their debt, and indirectly, by tying the possibilities for expansion of government
expenditure for a given steady state debt. Second, since dgc / dz> 0, it is clear that if the
scope is to ensure the solvency of firms without selling capital abroad, then it may be
necessary to increase public spending and thus increase the steady state government
debt.
8. Conclusions
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) have proposed a solvency rule as an alternative to the
Taylor rule for explaining the nature and role of monetary authorities in modern
economies. According to the solvency rule, monetary authorities set the nominal interest
rate as a function (among other things) of the inflation rate and the rate of capital
accumulation. This paper has analysed the working of the solvency rule in a stylised
monetary union characterised by structural divergences due to the different rates of
accumulation and inflation among its member countries. Building on the Post
Keynesian literature on the monetary circuit and endogenous money, it has derived
major effects of these structural divergences on the solvency of firms, and the
consequent allocation of ownership of existing physical capital among the member
countries of the stylised monetary union. The analysis, which helps to reinterpret the
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concept of "Mezzogiornification of Europe" originally suggested by Krugman (1991),
leads to the following main conclusions.
First, the solvency rule examined here associates the interest rate set by the
central monetary authority to the rates of capital centralization, i.e. the net sales of
existing capital from one member country to the other. This means that the decisions of
the central monetary authority may become crucial for the allocation of ownerships of
physical capital within the monetary union. Second, while a deflation policy enhances
the competitiveness of a country, it also reduces the value of the existing capital assets:
if the latter effect prevails on the former, this policy undermines the solvency condition.
Thus, if the central monetary authority requires deflation measures in exchange for
lower interest rates, the solvency of a country may not be maintained even through
increasing sales of capital abroad. Similarly, a currency devaluation policy can provoke
conflicting effects on the financial position of a country. Therefore, even the mere
abandonment of a monetary union may be inadequate to solve the problems of solvency
and competitiveness of a country. 14 Third, a national government is able to affect
positively the solvency condition of national firms, but at the expense of a rising steady
state of government debt. Therefore, a fiscal policy rule that imposes a government debt
reduction could worsen the solvency condition of national firms, and hence amplify the
transfer of ownership of physical capital from one country to another.
Finally, it is worthy highlighting that this paper is not about imperfections,
design or market failures that cause a crisis in an otherwise efficient monetary union
among a confederation of states. The conclusions of this paper apply to any monetary
union, with or without the imperfections or design failures, including the lack of
stabilising features like the existence of a central bank acting as lender of last resort, that
30
for instance De Grauwe (2013) and other authors have associated with the Eurozone.
Once this is appreciated, then many features of the paper should become clear,
including the limitations of the distinction between a “liquidity crisis” and a “solvency
crisis” in a monetary union; the issue of the solvency of commercial banks, which is
closely intertwined with the solvency of firms; the crucial links between trade deficits
and the solvency condition of firms and between the solvency of firms and the
sustainability of government debt.
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5 This solution should not be confused with the conventional, non-steady growth equilibrium. It is rather a
deviation from the so-called long-period classical position. This means that within each country
the effective rate of profit can differ from the normal rate, which corresponds to the long-period
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position (Garegnani, 1992; Kurz, 1994). Furthermore, the uniformity of the normal rates of profit
between countries is hindered by frictions in the free movements of capital and labour.
6 The analysis of the solvency condition of workers in a monetary union is not pursued here and left for
future research.
7 In order to examine the effects of a change in the degree of financial instability, this paper assumes that
LQWKHSUHYLRXVSHULRGȜt-1= 0 for both countries. Given this hypothesis, then the relationship (4)
between gcDQGȜLVDOZD\VSRVLWLYH$OWHUQDWLYHO\ZKHQȜt-1 WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQJc and
ȜLVSRVLWLYHLIȜLVJURZLQJWKDWLVȜ!Ȝt-1DQGLWLVQHJDWLYHLIȜLVGHFUHDVLQJRYHUWLPHWKDWLV
ȜȜt-1). This means that if a country is a net buyer of capital, this could be due to a growing
speculative trend. This result could be interpreted as an open economy version of the concept of
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.
8 The macroeconomic equilibriums (3) and (3c) and the solvency conditions (4) and (4c) have been built
under the hypothesis that cross-border dividends are negligible. However, it is possible to make
explicit them by assuming that profits of firms are distributed on the basis of two parameters,
namely Į and ȕ, that represent the share of national capital owned by the firms of country I and
II, respectively. It then follows that in equations (3) and (4) profits in country I are represented in
the following way:
 ĮȖU3t-1.ȕȖcrc)Pct-1Kc
If the firms of country I have been net owners of capital in the previous period (that is gc(t-1) > 0),
then Į  and ȕ!. An analogous expression with Į and ȕ applies to country II. In
this case, it is possible to show that the higher is ȕ, the higher is the risk of insolvency for the
firms of country II. In other words, positive cross-border dividends aggravate the position of the
firms which are net sellers of capital abroad.
9 Another possibility will be deliberate actions of a supranational fiscal authority. Given the goal of the
paper, this possibility is left for future research
10 Since the rate of centralization is strictly related to the net external position compatible with the
solvency conditions of firms, it is no surprise that the relationship between the current mark-ups
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used the notion of Mezzogiornification in order to describe the possibility of a growing
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activities. The (1) – (6) and (1c) – (6c) models offer a different interpretation of the notion of
“Mezzogiornification of Europe”. First, they do not require increasing returns of scale, and above
all do not entail references to full employment or a natural rate of unemployment. Second, the
fulfilment of the solvency conditions takes place without reference to the migrations of physical
capital and labour. In other words, the fulfilment of the solvency conditions could lead to the
centralization of the ownership and control of capital assets, but the question of the geographical
location of the firms is secondary.
12 See also, on the more general relationship between wage and effective demand, Hein and Schulten
(2004), Stockhammer (2011), and Stockhammer and Onaran (2012).
13 This result supports the numerous studies devoted to the counterintuitive effects of currency
devaluation (e.g. Blecker and Razmi, 2008). It also helps to highlight the limits of those attempts
to solve complex problems of open macroeconomic policy simply through extreme solutions on
exchange rates (Palley, 2003).
14 See, for a balanced assessment of the implications of the full opening of the capital and goods markets
to foreign transactions, Chang (2004), Grabel (2011) and Rodrik (2011).
Fig. 1 – The “Solvency Rule” in a Two-Country Monetary Union
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